PLANNING AND GOOD FAITH

I would like to start by recalling how on October 16th, 1987, in Reykjavik, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev spoke affirmatively of eliminating their nuclear arsenals within ten years and confidently of convincing the other nuclear weapon states to follow suit. Agreement was thwarted that day by what, in retrospect, ought to have been a minor issue: anti-ballistic-missiles. A quarter of a century later, these systems still do not exist in a viable form.

Now, please consider the following question:

If, after Reykjavik, the UN General Assembly had immediately mandated an open-ended working group to “develop proposals for taking forward multilateral negotiations on the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons,” could that group have made recommendations that would have significantly altered the course of history?

It is hard to imagine that the working group would have recommended the course of action which ultimately unfolded: slavish adherence to a step-by-step approach. Negotiations of a CTBT would no doubt have been considered a step ripe for action; indeed, within less than a year, an amendment to the Partial Test Ban Treaty was proposed by six non-nuclear-weapon states. This led to an Amendment Conference in January 1991 and then negotiations in the CD in 1993. (More on this later.) But the real opportunity before such a working group would have been to break out of the step-by-step straightjacket imposed by the Cold War and adopt a comprehensive, multilateral approach to the establishment of a NWFW. In effect, to return to the original intent of the United Nations as expressed in the very first resolution of the United Nations General Assembly in January 1946 which established a commission to make proposals for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”

It is time to acknowledge that labeling the step-by-step approach ‘pragmatic’ does not alter the fact that it is not delivering results at anything like the pace initially anticipated at the end of the Cold War, nor at a pace commensurate with the extraordinary risk nuclear policies subject the world to. This does not mean there is no room for quick steps. There is. It means, we cannot allow step-by-step to be the whole picture.

When you think about it, step-by step is by definition the slowest way to accomplish something. If there is only one actor – incapable of multitasking – then step-by-step is the only way to get the job done.
Think of one person assembling an IKEA bookshelf. But in most tasks – and nuclear disarmament is surely among them – multitasking is eminently feasible.

The challenge can be grouped into steps which can be undertaken simultaneously as distinct tasks. More often than not, there is a logic as to when the various tasks should be completed so that that result can be built upon while completing other tasks. But this does not mean that other tasks have to be suspended in the meantime. Even when building a house, parts of the roof can be ‘pre-fabricated’ while the foundation is being laid. As you work to ‘develop proposals’ please keep this principle firmly in mind.

To “develop proposals” is to ‘plan’. Even proceeding step-by-step is quite meaningless without planning. Who would buy an IKEA bookshelf if after each step you had to write in asking for the next step? And what confidence would you have in the process if the reply was, “Oh, sorry, we are still trying to figure out what the next step is! But don’t worry: we will get back to you as soon as we have it figured out.” If IKEA had operated that way, they would still be a little family business in rural Sweden. So what of the great nuclear powers: Have they described the next step after the FMCT? Have they worked out the sequence of reductions all the way to zero? Are they designing the institutions to sustain a non-possession / non-acquisition regime? Or even sketched out what they might be like? So the “pragmatic” step-by-step approach is really more of a step-by-unspecified-step approach. That is worse than the slowest way to get the job done! No wonder some suspect it is championed specifically to ensure the job never gets done – at least not in this century!

One way to plan is to compile all the specific tasks that need to be accomplished in order to properly establish a NWFW. Figure out which of them can be pursued simultaneous; and put them in proper relationship with each other so that everything falls seamlessly into place at the end yielding a sustainable NWFW. This will mean not leaving the hardest parts till later, when they will only hold up the entire production. It means start right to work on the hardest tasks so that they get the full-measure of attention they deserve. Plan ahead. No construction company would start signing purchase orders or subcontracts until it was sure the overall building plan was adequately worked out.

What is the incentive for negotiating an FMCT if the plan for achieving and maintaining a NWFW is still up in the air? We need a plan we can believe in.

How precise does this plan need to be? There are various schools of thought on this. We can immediately rule out something vague like, “pursue negotiations in good faith on cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and on nuclear disarmament.” First, we already have that (in the NPT’s Article VI); second, it isn’t working.

What about a framework convention? If this working group were to develop a complete plan for multilateral negotiations on achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons, the endorsement of that plan by the UN General Assembly would constitute an immense step forward. The only question is whether 15 days of collective effort is sufficient to develop such a plan? It is worth considering. But if more time is needed, the way forward is not so hard to divine.
Recall the 2010 NPT Review Conference: the committee dealing with the disarmament cluster had before it a draft by the Chairman which included a remarkably farsighted proposal to mandate the UN Secretary General to convene a “Road Plan” Conference. (The fate of that proposal will be touched upon later.) At first blush, following a road seems to involve just putting one step in front of another. Are we back to the step-by-step approach? Not at all, because in this case the road needs to be built as well as traversed. The surveyors have to go into the wilderness and plot the best route. Work can begin on several stretches of the road at the same time. The hardest bit – bridges and tunnels – can be given priority. The materials and equipment must be lined up in advanced so that it is on hand when needed.

*In short, at the beginning, it’s all about planning.*

The nuclear-weapon states should bring to this challenge the same advanced systems planning they apply to the development of modern weapon systems. And while they are at it the same level of funding! Even one-hundredth the level would probably suffice!

---

Speaking of the nuclear-weapon states, where are they? They should be here. But they’re not.

They say that they do not want to be “distracted”; they are ‘busy’ pursuing the step-by-step approach. For the last four years they have been hard at work – if meeting an average of less than two days a year can be called that. (See Appendix.) They aim to present a “glossary of terms” to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. Let us hope that the reports they have agreed to submit to the 2014 PrepComm on implementation of the Action Points on nuclear disarmament will go beyond a progress report on this glossary. To give credit where credit is due, the UK has had the foresight to work with a non-nuclear weapon state, Norway, on a system for verifying that when a bomb is presented for elimination, in is in fact a nuclear bomb. We would like to see more of that kind of multitasking.

So, while there is nothing wrong with the nuclear weapon states talking among each other, it would be a grave mistake to not embed those talks within a larger planning and implementation process. If some of the nuclear-weapon states are AWOL (Absent Without Leave) today, then we will just have to carry on without them to create that larger context. We have among us states which have dismantled nuclear weapons and disposed of ballistic missile. While the scale of the operation will be greater, the basic tasks are not dissimilar.

*A rough-sketch plan is fully within the capacity of the countries now present.*

If more than fifteen days are required, then perhaps the key recommended to the First Committee should be to convene a ‘Road Map’ Conference originally proposed in 2010. You can succeed where the Review Conference failed.
So why did the RevCon fail? Up until its final day, the nuclear-weapon states did not raise any objection to the Road Map Action Point. Only after hard-fought agreement had been reached on all the other Action Points, did they—like a pack of wolves—turn upon the Road Map proposal, demanding it be expunged. Faced with the prospect of losing all the gains of four weeks of effort, the non-nuclear-weapon states yielded. One can debate whether it was wise to succumb to such bad-faith bargaining, but surely that need not be the fate of such a proposal in this setting. Even if the nuclear-weapons states do deign to appear, they cannot ride rough-sod over this body as at the RevCon.

This body is a sub-committee of the General Assembly and as such it operates by General Assembly rules. It was set up despite opposition from some nuclear-weapon states and it can ensure its productivity despite opposition as well. The focus must remain firmly upon making recommendations that “take forward multilateral negotiations.”

Mr. Chairman,

I would now like to say a few more words about ‘good faith.’

Let’s start with the obvious: to display good faith, you have to be present. All of you are showing basic good faith by being here. Those who are not present but have agreed to be represented through a group or have sent a message to account for their temporary absence have, at least, good intentions. Those who have made no effort to handle or explain their absence are not acting in good faith. And—let’s not mince words—those who, without the slightest attempt to engage constructively, dismiss the Working Group are acting in bad faith. This can only damage their standing in the NPT context.

These states are calling the Working Group a ‘distraction’. In essence, they are accusing those who take part in the Group either of knowingly promoting activity which will not be productive (i.e. acting in bad faith) or of an inability to understand that it is a distraction (i.e. despite well-meaning intentions). Both charges are very serious and should be backed up with cogent arguments, in order to expose those acting in bad faith and to enlighten the well-meaning. Instead, we get a circular argument, “because we don’t think your approach cannot succeed, we will do nothing to help it succeed” which blends into “because we will not help it succeed, it will fail.” The pretense is that “I may be ready to act in good faith, but what does that matter when the next guy is not?” However, one only has the moral authority to question the good faith of others when one has fulfilled the basic requirement of being present.

(Even more troubling are collective decisions, such as that to boycott the Oslo Conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons.)

Regarding the theme of “planning”, good-faith planning would take a collaborative approach to the task. No one has a monopoly on best ideas. All proposals should have a chance to be heard; the best elements of each proposal should be put into a positive, ‘synergistic’ relationship with the others. This is not a zero-sum game. We are all winners when the catastrophic threat of nuclear war is lifted from our people. There is no need to worry about ‘diminished security’ everyone’s security will be greatly enhanced.
It is important not to just be satisfied with naming and blaming. Participating nations should proactively court the hold-out nations. Such dialog may, in exceptional cases, overcome the absent party’s reluctance. More likely, change will be mediated via domestic debates stirred up by civil society. Governments must play with the cards (i.e., other governments) they are dealt, for better or worse; but **civil society can in many instances change the cards** (i.e. government policies and even governments).

The starting point in nearly all countries is that:

a) there is very broad public support for the establishment of a NWFW; and

b) the public wants and expects its government to act in good faith to that end.

No government benefits from being seen as obstructionist, out of line with world opinion, and in bad company. But that requires being actually being seen. **Those governments seeking the engagement of others must openly express not only their dismay at the current negative attitude but also their high expectations of a more forthcoming response upon further reflection.** This can serve as a powerful point of reference for the internal debates, significantly improving the odds of civil society turning the reluctant governments around.

A classic example of this is the Partial Test Ban Treaty amendment effort. The proposal to convert the Treaty into a CTBT was submitted by non-nuclear-weapon states parties on the 25th anniversary of the Treaty in 1988. This, plus the backing of one-third of the states parties within six months, signaled to the public in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, that the rest of the world was deeply dissatisfied with the way this issue was being sidelined in the CD, and that they were hopeful that an unconventional approach to the matter might elicit a better response. Despite opposition from the US and UK, the January 1991 Amendment Conference concluded by empowering its President, Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, to reconvene the Conference “when more propitious circumstances prevail.” Indeed, in July 1993, he announced that he would convene preparatory consultations at UN headquarters to that end.

In the United States, mayors, members of Congress, and civil society had spoken out in favor of the PTBT Amendment Conference and made the test ban a significant issue in the 1992 presidential elections. But in 1993, the new Clinton Administration was dithering over whether to strike a bilateral ‘low-yield-threshold’ deal with the Russians or to take the multilateral route to a comprehensive ban. The combination of external options and internal pressure encouraged the right course of action. Thus, the morning the collective July PTBT consultations were to begin in New York, word arrived from Geneva that the United States had finally agreed to multilateral negotiations on a CTBT in the CD.

(Might the OEWG lead to another breakthrough in the CD? Possibly ... possibly not. There has been very little time to raise public awareness and expectations about the OEWG. So, it is unlikely the OEWG will have an impact on the deadlock in the CD in 2013. For now, the CD will have to find its own way forward.)
The key lesson is to make the most of the current mandate and to recommend to the 2013 First Committee, among other points, a more advanced mandate for the Working Group in 2014. For domestic public pressure to mount in the nuclear armed states and their allies, the effort must be sustained internationally. We trust that this is the intention of the states gathered here today as it is the surest way forward. We are keen to be your partners in this undertaking, each fulfilling an essential function in overcoming the reluctance of some states – of their leaders, not of the broad public – to live in a NWFW.

To conclude, Mr Chairman,

In a sense, we are talking about the ‘tough love’ that those trapped in self-destructive behavior need from others to extricate themselves from danger. Risk-taking – as is well documented with gambling – can become addictive. It becomes a menace to those around the addict when he/she begins gambling with what is not his/hers. Those affected must intervene or face the consequences. The nuclear enterprise jeopardizes the well being of all of us sharing this extraordinary planet with its fragile ecosystem. At the Oslo Conference, climate scientists, agriculturalists, nutritionists, and physicians warned us that the damage which would be caused by nuclear war is far, far greater that previously acknowledged. Its worst consequences have not yet been inflicted upon us, thank goodness, but every day we live on borrowed time. We must act with urgency.

Still, the nuclear armed states ‘caution’ us not to rush and – blinded by their addiction – plead that they see no viable alternative. You must show them the alternative and lay out the path to it; civil society must ensure that they open their eyes and, in good faith, go down that path with you.

APPENDIX: Meetings of the P5 since the September 2009

There had not been any P5 meetings on nuclear disarmament since 1949.

2-3 September 2009, London: Conference on CBM toward Nuclear Disarmament

25 September 2009, New York: UN Security Council Summit of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (with other members of the SC)

30 June – 1 July 2011, Paris: First Follow-on Meeting on CBM (Second P5 Conference)

27-29 June 2012, Washington: Third P5 Conference

18-19 April 2013, Geneva: Fourth P5 Conference

Total meeting time: 10 days
Out of approximately: 1320 days
2009 London – The P5 issued the following statement describing the conference:

Begin Statement: The P5 states (China, France, Russia, UK and US) met in London on 3-4 September for a conference on confidence building measures towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues. After the conference they issued a statement reaffirming their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The conference was originally proposed by the UK Defence Secretary at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008 and was referred to by the UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, in a speech on 17 March 2009. The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to all objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that we should advance on all fronts to achieve them. They reiterated their enduring commitment to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the NPT and noted that these obligations apply to all NPT States Parties. They stressed their intention to work with all States Parties to the NPT in creating the conditions to enable further progress under Article VI. They called upon all non-NPT States to work towards the same objective. In a wide ranging discussion, the P5 considered the confidence-building, verification and compliance challenges associated with achieving further progress toward disarmament and non-proliferation, and steps to address those challenges. They looked at ways to increase mutual understanding by sharing definitions of nuclear terminology and information about their nuclear doctrines and capabilities. They made presentations on enhancing P5 strategic stability and building mutual confidence through voluntary transparency and other measures. They also considered the international challenges associated with responding to nuclear [power] accidents and undertook to consider ways to co-operate to address these challenges. End Statement.

This official statement cannot be found on any of the governments’ websites. It is available on Wikileaks; the full text of the leaked cables can be found at: http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09LONDON2622

July 1, 2011

Joint Statement on First P-5 Follow-Up Meeting to the NPT Review Conference

Begin Text:

The P-5 met in Paris on 30 June – 1 July for their first follow-up meeting to the NPT Review Conference, with a view to considering progress on the commitments they made at this Conference, as well as to following up on the London Conference on Confidence Building Measures towards Nuclear Disarmament in September 2009.

They reaffirmed their unconditional support for the NPT, which remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They also reaffirmed the recommendations set out in the balanced Action Plan agreed in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and called on all States Parties to the NPT to work together to advance its implementation.

They met with the determination to work together in pursuit of their shared goal of nuclear disarmament under Article VI of the NPT, including engagement on the steps outlined in Action 5, as well as reporting
and other efforts called for in the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan. They called on all States, both States Parties and Non Parties, to contribute to this nuclear disarmament objective, including by ensuring that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime remains robust and reliable.

The P-5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency and mutual confidence, including nuclear doctrine and capabilities, and of verification, recognizing such measures are important for establishing a firm foundation for further disarmament efforts. In order to increase efficiency of P-5 nuclear consultation, they approved to continue working on an agreed glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms and established a dedicated working group.

The P-5 discussed the particular political and technical challenges associated with verification in achieving further progress towards disarmament and ensuring non-proliferation. They shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification. They will continue their discussion of this issue later this year at an expert-level meeting in London.

As a follow-up to the 2010 NPT RevCon discussions, the P-5 shared their views on how to respond to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty, while recognizing the provisions of Article X. They also stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the adoption of the Additional Protocol and the reinforcement of IAEA’s resources and capabilities for deterring and detecting non-compliance.

The P-5 States recalled their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. They called upon all States to uphold the moratorium on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the objective and purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force. They reiterated their support for immediate commencement of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, including verification provisions. In order to sustain the potential of negotiations in the CD, the P-5 will, prior to the next United Nations General Assembly, renew their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations.

The P-5 welcomed the steps taken by the U.S., Russia and the UK towards holding a Conference on a Middle East WMD Free Zone (MEWMDFZ) in 2012.

The P-5 will follow on their discussions and hold a third P-5 Conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

---

**Joint Statement on P5 Conference on Implementing Nuclear Treaty**

**29 June 2012**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Office of the Spokesperson
June 29, 2012

Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT
Following is the text of a joint statement issued by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States of America at the conclusion of the Third P5 Conference: Implementing the NPT June 27-29, 2012 in Washington, D.C.

(Begin text)

The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or “P5,” met in Washington on June 27-29, 2012, in the wake of the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences to review progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and to continue discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and emphasized the importance of working together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2011 Paris P5 Conference. In particular, the P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, continued their discussion of how to report on their relevant activities, and shared views, across all three pillars of the NPT, on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee and the intersessional period. The 2012 PrepCom outcome included issuance of a P5 statement comprehensively addressing issues in all three pillars (NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/12).

The P5 continued their previous discussions on the issues of transparency, mutual confidence, and verification, and considered proposals for a standard reporting form. The P5 recognize the importance of establishing a firm foundation for mutual confidence and further disarmament efforts, and the P5 will continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5, with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon final document.

Participants received a briefing from the United States on U.S. activities at the Nevada National Security Site. This was offered with a view to demonstrate ideas for additional approaches to transparency.

Another unilateral measure was a tour of the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center located at the U.S. Department of State, where the P5 representatives have observed how the United States maintains a communications center to simultaneously implement notification regimes, including under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Vienna Document.

The P5 agreed on the work plan for a P5 working group led by China, assigned to develop a glossary of definitions for key nuclear terms that will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters.

The P5 again shared information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification, including information on the P5 expert level meeting hosted by the UK in April, at which the UK shared the outcomes and lessons from the UK-Norway Initiative disarmament verification research project. The P5 heard presentations on lessons learned from New START Treaty implementation, were given an overview of U.S.-UK verification work, and agreed to consider attending a follow-up P5 briefing on this work to be hosted by the United States.
As a further follow-up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the P5 shared their views on how to discourage abuse of the NPT withdrawal provision (Article X), and how to respond to notifications made consistent with the provisions of that article. The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. The P5 agreed that states remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 discussed concrete proposals for strengthening IAEA safeguards, including through promoting the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol; and the reinforcement of the IAEA’s resources and capabilities for effective safeguards implementation, including verification of declarations by States.

The P5 reiterated their commitment to promote and ensure the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its universalization. The P5 reviewed progress in developing the CTBT’s verification regime in all its aspects and efforts towards entry into force. Ways to enhance the momentum for completing the verification regime, including the on-site inspection component, were explored. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. The moratoria, though important, are not substitutes for legally binding obligations under the CTBT.

The P5 discussed ways to advance a mutual goal of achieving a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), building on CD/1864, and exchanged perspectives on ways to break the current impasse in the CD, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD.

The P5 remain concerned about serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime and in this connection, recalled their joint statement of May 3 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT.

An exchange of views on how to support a successful conference in 2012 on a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction was continued.

The P5 agreed to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 will follow on their discussions and hold a fourth P5 conference in the context of the next NPT Preparatory Committee.

Following is the text of a joint statement issued by China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States at the conclusion of the Fourth P5 Conference: On the Way to the 2015 NPT Review Conference, April 18-19, in Geneva, Switzerland.

Begin Text:
The five Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) nuclear-weapon states, or "P5," met in Geneva on April 18-19, 2013 under the chairmanship of the Russian Federation to build on the 2009 London, 2011 Paris, and 2012 Washington P5 conferences. The P5 reviewed progress towards fulfilling the commitments made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and continued discussions on issues related to all three pillars of the NPT – non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament, including confidence-building, transparency, and verification experiences. The P5 also had a positive exchange with representatives of civil society during the Geneva P5 Conference.

The P5 reaffirmed their commitment to the shared goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament as provided for in Article VI of the NPT, and emphasized the importance of continuing to work together in implementing the 2010 NPT Review Conference Action Plan. The P5 reviewed the outcome of the 2012 Preparatory Committee for the 2015 NPT Review Conference, and significant developments in the context of the NPT since the 2012 Washington P5 Conference. They assessed issues relating to strategic stability and international security, and exchanged views concerning prospects for further steps to promote dialogue and mutual confidence in this area, including in a multilateral format.

In addition, the P5 welcomed a briefing by the Russian Federation and the United States on the ongoing implementation of the New START Treaty and its success to date. The P5 were also briefed by the Russian Federation and the United States on the joint 2012 inspection in Antarctica conducted pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and its Environmental Protocol. This joint inspection included verification that the international stations are implementing relevant environmental rules and that facilities are used only for peaceful purposes. The P5 shared views on objectives for the 2013 Preparatory Committee, the intersessional period thereafter, and looked ahead to the 2014 Preparatory Committee and 2015 Review Conference.

The P5 discussed the latest developments in the area of multilateral disarmament initiatives including the situation at the Conference on Disarmament. They expressed their shared disappointment that the Conference on Disarmament continues to be prevented from agreeing on a comprehensive program of work, including work on a legally binding, verifiable international ban on the production of fissile material (FMCT) for use in nuclear weapons, and discussed efforts to find a way forward in the Conference on Disarmament, including by continuing their efforts with other relevant partners to promote such negotiations within the CD. The P5 reiterated their support for the immediate start of negotiations on a treaty encompassing such a ban in the Conference on Disarmament. They noted the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on FMCT, and expressed the hope that its work will help spur negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. The P5 reaffirmed the historic contribution of the pragmatic, step-by-step process to nuclear disarmament and stressed the continued validity of this proven route. In this context, they also emphasized their shared understanding of the serious consequences of nuclear weapon use and that the P5 would continue to give the highest priority to avoiding such contingencies.

The P5 advanced their previous discussions of an approach to reporting on their relevant activities across all three pillars of the NPT Action Plan at the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, consistent with the NPT Action Plan, and resolved to continue working on this issue under France’s leadership. They plan to continue their discussions in multiple ways within the P5 with a view to reporting to the 2014 PrepCom, consistent with their commitments under Actions 5, 20, and 21 of the 2010 RevCon Final Document. They welcomed the progress made on the development of the P5 glossary of key nuclear terms under China’s leadership and discussed next steps. They stressed the importance of this work, which will increase P5 mutual understanding and facilitate further P5 discussions on nuclear matters. The P5 reaffirmed their objective to submit a P5 glossary of key nuclear terms to the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The P5 are working toward the establishment of a firm foundation for mutual confidence and
further disarmament efforts. They shared further information on their respective bilateral and multilateral experiences in verification and resolved to continue such exchanges.

The P5 recalled their Joint Statement of 3 May 2012 at the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference and pledged to continue their efforts in different formats and at various international fora to find peaceful diplomatic solutions to the outstanding problems faced by the non-proliferation regime. They reiterated their call on the states concerned to fulfill without delay their international obligations under the appropriate UN Security Council resolutions, undertakings with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other appropriate international commitments. In the context of the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 12 February 2013 and the continued pursuit of certain nuclear activities by Iran, both contrary to the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and IAEA Board of Governors resolutions, the P5 reaffirmed their concerns about these serious challenges to the non-proliferation regime.

The P5 underlined the fundamental importance of an effective IAEA safeguards system in preventing nuclear proliferation and facilitating cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The P5 stressed the need for strengthening IAEA safeguards including through the promotion of the universal adoption of the Additional Protocol and the development of approaches to IAEA safeguards implementation based on objective state factors. They also discussed the role of the P5 in assisting the IAEA in cases involving possible detection of nuclear weapon programs in non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) in conformity with the provisions of the NPT.

The P5 continued their previous discussions of efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and reviewed the recent UK-hosted P5 Experts Meeting on CTBT, at which the P5 identified a number of areas for future P5 collaboration and decided to pursue further intersessional work, in particular ahead of the Integrated Field Exercise in 2014. The P5 called upon all States to uphold their national moratoria on nuclear weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, and to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force.

The P5 shared their views on how to prevent abuse of NPT withdrawal (Article X). The discussion included modalities under which NPT States Party could respond collectively and individually to a notification of withdrawal, including through arrangements regarding the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or derived under safeguards during NPT membership. They resolved to make efforts to broaden consensus among NPT States Party on the latter issue at the 2014 PrepCom, thus making a further contribution to the NPT Review Process.

The P5 reiterated the importance of the implementation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference decisions related to the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, in particular those related to the convening of a conference to be attended by all the States of the Middle East on the establishment of the Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region. They underlined their support for all States concerned, making all efforts necessary for the preparation and convening of the Conference in the nearest future. They also reiterated their full support to the ongoing efforts of the facilitator.

The P5 reviewed their efforts to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. They reaffirmed their view that establishment of such zones helps to build confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states, enhance regional and international security, and reinforce the NPT and the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They reaffirmed their readiness to sign the Protocol to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone as
soon as possible. They underlined the importance of holding consultations, including on the margins of the Second PrepCom, with the States Party to the Treaty on a Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone in Central Asia. They noted also the parallel declarations, adopted by the P5 and Mongolia concerning Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status, at the United Nations headquarters in New York on 17 September 2012.

The P5 pledged to continue to meet at all appropriate levels on nuclear issues to further promote dialogue and mutual confidence. The P5 plan to follow up their discussions and hold a fifth P5 conference in 2014.

End text.