The WMD Forum

Prospects for a Zone Free from Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East
Maintaining the Momentum and Supporting the Facilitator

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Panel I: Amman Security Colloquium

Amre Moussa, described the establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East (WMDFZ-ME) as a vital and important requirement for a stable future of the Middle East. The Arab spring and political transformations witnessed throughout the Middle East should be accompanied by a reconsideration of the regional security system, a system that should be agreed upon by all protagonists in the region, taking into account the establishment of a WMDFZ-ME. The keynote speaker called for a rapprochement among Arab states indicating that Arabs already have common interests and therefore should have unified action. The creation of the zone should not target a specific country but should be a comprehensive process. As we approach the end of 2012 with no clear indication about the Helsinki conference on a WMDFZ-ME, Moussa expressed pessimism of not having the Helsinki initiative being held on time. In conclusion, Amre Moussa recognized the effort of creating an Arab Consortium on Security and Disarmament stressing that this is a timely initiative.

Hans Blix, stated that in 1995 the NPT would hardly have been extended but for a resolution on a WMDFZ in the Middle East; adding that the NPT review conference in 2010 would not have ended positively if not for the resolution on a meeting regarding the zone. The projected zone meeting has deep roots; all parties to the NPT have a commitment to make it a reality. On its part, Israel has had its own methods of countering proliferation risks in the region, this included the bombing of Osirak reactor (Iraq/1981), the bombing of Al Kibar suspected Syrian reactor (Syria/2007) and urging the bombing of Iranian facilities (2012); a method that has not seemed sustainable as it clearly violate the UN Charter. Israel has also supported UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. However, the support has always come with a caveat – ‘not just now’!’. Mr Blix indicated that at a time when the world's attention is riveted on the uranium enrichment program in Iran, it would be strange, however, if a discussion about a zone were to be limited to Israeli nuclear weapons, stressing that a zone should do more than bringing Israel to do away with its nuclear weapons capacity, but should also bring Iran to do away with its enrichment program, and should bring all the states in the region to abstain – perhaps for 25 years – from both enrichment of uranium and production of plutonium as well as nuclear weapons. Hans Blix expressed hope that the Helsinki meeting will take place, if not in December 2012, perhaps on a later stage? Indicating that the aim of the meeting is to start an ongoing process.
Piet De Klerk, Ambassador of the Netherlands in Amman and sherpa of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, highlighted the important commitment of the Netherlands to working constructively towards global solutions for security challenges. This includes attaching great importance to a strong international regime that aims at, inter alia, preventing the further spread of weapons of mass destruction, which implies that legally binding treaties should be the basis for this regime. Ambassador De Klerk explained his government position of supporting the implementation of treaties completely banning chemical and biological weapons, adding that the Netherlands fully supports the Non-Proliferation Treaty which is the key legal instrument, intrinsically linked to IAEA safeguards, including the Additional Protocol in addition to other arrangements like the Nuclear Suppliers Group as part of a strong regime. Nuclear disarmament is, like non-proliferation, an integral part of the international system. The Netherlands subscribes to the conclusions and recommendations of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, including the call to convene, in consultation with the States of the region, a conference, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Piet De Klerk affirmed the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs readiness to assist the facilitator in any way it can, and also to support others, like the Arab Institute for Security Studies, that help to keep the issue high on the international agenda.

Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, expressed appreciation to the sponsors of the Amman meeting and acknowledged the ongoing cooperation between the Partnership for Global Security and the Arab Institute for Security Studies. The 2014 nuclear security summit which is due to be held in the Hague in 2014 is an important process; developments on the nuclear security front will positively impact non proliferation efforts. Mr. Luongo expressed optimism that the Amman meeting will positively contribute to this process as it will witness the hosting of the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG).

Ayman Khalil, Director of the Arab Institute for Security Studies, thanked the sponsors of the Amman meeting and reaffirmed the importance of civil society organizations in creating a WMDFZ-ME. Civil society sector is a potential shaker of governments and capable of shaping public opinion. International instruments (and the facilitator office) could utilize and invest on civil society role to achieve progress, in the context of 2012 HCME, as well as in general terms. Hence, it is important to institutionalize the activities of civil society and promote their engagement in discussions pertaining to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Ayman Khalil concluded by stressing on the importance of the Amman meeting, adding that the final document of the 2010 NPT RevCon makes clear reference to the important role played by civil society in promoting the establishment of a WMFDFZ in the Middle East.
Panel II: The Arab Network on Disarmament – Inception, Objectives and Official Launch
Chair and moderator: Mohamad Shaker, Director of the Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs

Mahmoud Nasreddine, Professor in Saint Joseph University’s Institute of Political Science and Secretary-General of the Middle East and North Africa Strategic Studies Center (Beirut), spoke about the importance of establishing an Arab Disarmament Consortium. As the number of research centers, think tanks and academic institutions focusing on disarmament and nonproliferation issues in Arab Countries is very limited, the establishment of a network is seen as a fruitful move. The diversity of the field of interest and the backgrounds of researchers and analysts in these centers will contribute to a better and more comprehensive research that will be presented to the decision makers in the Arab countries. Prof. Nasreddine concluded that the most important task of the newly established consortium is to establish an efficient way of cooperation between these centers and to define an action plan of the network for the next period.

Mohamed Kadry Said, head of the Security Studies Unit at Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Cairo). Establishing the Arab consortium for Arab think tanks working on security and non-proliferation issues was promoted by the League of Arab States which was successful in hosting a core group of 15 research centers from various parts of the Arab world. The League’s meeting in Cairo, held on May 2012, identified a steering committee, responsible for organizing consortium activities. The committee decided to convene in Amman on November 12th to officially inaugurate the network within the framework of the Amman WMD forum that enjoys the participation of many experts, and shortly before the Helsinki meeting. Many Arab countries are undergoing severe security problems and challenges. No doubt that the establishment of WMDFZ would contribute to stabilizing the regional situation, an objective that needs a clear road map. The existence of the Arab Network on Disarmament is expected to contribute to global disarmament which means lowering threat perceptions and increasing development prospects in the region.

Fadi Abi Allam, president and executive director of the Permanent Peace Movement. (Lebanon). The role of civil society in establishing a WMDFZ-ME is a role that relates to the legitimacy of these organizations. This legitimacy is drawn from the level of interaction and response by civil society towards peoples needs and aspirations, especially in the human security level. Fear residing within the people of the Middle East is an important factor for the instability witnessed in the region, fear is driving state actors as well as non-state actors to possess non-traditional capabilities and maintain a balance of power against each other. We witness an arms race which includes light weapons, conventional weapons as well as WMD capabilities which contributes to fuelling hate and feuds. Efforts exerted to establish a WMDFZ is a pre-requisite to achieving a peaceful settlement in the region. Fadi concluded by highlighting the possible contribution of civil society organizations and the importance of the Arab network on disarmament.

Panel III: Nuclear Weapons and Other Categories of WMDs – Regional and Security Implications
Chair and moderator: Ali Saeidi, Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs

Jean-Pascal Zanders, senior research fellow at the European Union Institute for Security Studies. The rationale of lumping Nuclear, Chemical and Biological weapons together is often debated, stating that nuclear weapons are always the focus, and that it ought not to be. De-segregating WMD’s into their three basic elements is the solution, stressing that the problem relates to the lack of a legal definition for the term “WMD” which
happens to be amorphous since such weapons span a huge spectrum. Dual-use issues is another complexity which is also associated with the lack of a clear definition if WMDs. To demonstrate the complexity, the speaker referred to the uses of white phosphorous which was used by Israel in Gaza and by US forces in Falluja; Today, white phosphorous is also used as a smoke weapon to mark a target; white phosphorous and other items needs to be incorporated into the CWC. Each of the legal instruments created to deal with various categories of WMDs addresses only small aspects of the entire system, making the WMD approach a fragmented one. The speaker concluded that while there is a need to separate the three categories of WMDs, we must still maintain close coordination of the three categories for progress to take place.

Ali Karami, associate professor at Baqiyatallah University of Medical Sciences in Tehran. The dual uses of biological agents makes it very difficult to detect, even qualified inspectors finds it almost impossible to confirm the existence of biological weapons due to their dual civil/military uses and also due to the very secretive arrangements. Anthrax is a good example, the anthrax vaccine can be quickly converted to anthrax which makes it difficult to prove intentions. Although much attention is given to nuclear weapons, the speaker affirmed that biological weapons represent a greater risk. The speaker referred to few cases within the Iranian context including a “suspicious outbreak” in Iran in 2006 in which a “few people” died and believes that was most likely a case of bioterrorism. He also stated that in the early 2000s during the US anthrax outbreak, Iran has received 2 envelopes with anthrax inside. Dr Karami touched upon Iran’s nuclear program which is dedicated for peaceful purposes, he referred to the “fatwa”, the religious ruling prohibiting the development or possession of nuclear weapons as proof that Iran would not engage in nuclear proliferation and that no evidence exists that Iran is moving towards proliferation.

Dina Esfandiary, research analyst at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK). Suggested that Syria has the largest chemical weapons arsenal in the Middle East, which was created as a balance against Israel's nuclear weapons. Syria's program began in the 1970s and received assistance from North Korea and Iran as recently confirmed by Wikileaks. Despite the lack of information, intelligence, and resources relating to chemical weapons in Syria, it is feared that Syria will lose control of its stockpiles, allowing for the spread of weapons to the rebels or to non-state actors like Hezbollah. With porous borders, weapons could escape the country posing the question of how such an arsenal might be secured. The speaker then highlighted a number of theoretical options that have been proposed including a possible Israeli air strike. This is extremely unsafe, as it will lead to fallout, looting (and/or) weapons getting into the wrong hands. The Middle East has a proven history of using chemical weapons including an alleged Egyptian use of chemical weapons in Yemen's civil war and the existence of an Egyptian chemical weapons program in the 1960s. As for Iran, the speaker suggests that Iran has a chemical program, adding that Iran has declared its facilities after joining the CWC, but not declaring its weapons. Dina agrees that various WMD categories should be separated, stating that the focus should be on chemical weapons first.

Panel IV: Obstacles Facing the Helsinki Process
Chair and moderator: Saja Majali, head of international organizations unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jordan).

Lukasz Kulesa, head of the non-proliferation and arms control project at the Polish Institute of International Affairs. Addressing a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone could be referred to as “mission impossible”, particularly when including delivery systems to the scope of the zone. The task is unique, both in scope and difficulty, if for no other reason, because not all states involved recognize each other. A number of political impediments including regional political transformation, the Syrian conflict, the Iranian “crisis” and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are factors which make it difficult to focus on WMD non-proliferation. Following a discussion on
strategic impediments facing the Helsinki Process, Mr. Kulesa concluded that the Obama administration is unlikely to use its limited political capital to leverage Israel to act upon anything but the peace process.

**Istvan Balogh, junior research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.** Analyzing trends affecting foreign policy of key regional power brokers explains how their regional position and interests may either promote or hinder the accomplishment of the Helsinki conference goals. Iran has clearly benefited from the regional strategic trends of the past decade. Israel’s absence is closely connected to its military capabilities as well as the Arab-Israel conflict. The Arab Spring destabilized Israel’s strategic environment and for now it is not likely to engage in realizing any “grand design” for the region, thus, it is more likely to standby and wait for events to span out. The position regarding the prospect of a WMDFZ of other regional power brokers is likely to depend on the stances of the two previous players, namely Israel and Iran. Mr Balog concludes that Turkey is significant element when it comes to the zone issue due to the presence of US tactical weapons and NATO interceptors, expressing that he was not enthusiastic for the creation of a MEWMDFZ.

**Erzsébet Rozsa, executive director and senior research fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs.** The Middle East is generally considered as one of the most conflict-prone regions of the world. In spite of the fact that all categories of WMDs can be found here, the region has no security architecture or common security culture. While the proposed Helsinki Conference on the Middle East would be a step forward, the political and social trends and “facts on the ground” may prove to be unsurpassable obstacles along the way. While – as historical evidence shows – a NWFZ can be started with only a number of regional states upon the expectation of a snowball effect. In the Middle East there is one country (Israel) generally accepted as having nuclear weapons, and another (Iran) which is considered by many a threat due to its nuclear program, the participation of both is vital, even if the MEC is understood as not just one conference, but rather as the beginning of a long process. The complexity of this undertaking, i.e. balancing and counter-balancing different capabilities, security concerns, the necessity of operating bilateral and multilateral tracks etc, may prove an insurmountable obstacle.

**Panel V: Delivery Vehicles and the Zone**

Chair and moderator: Bernd W. Kubbig, project director at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) and Adj. Professor at Goethe University.

**Michael Haas, member of the “Academic Peace Orchestra Middle East.** Summarizing input by 39 authors of a study discussing delivery vehicles and the zone; capping and banning missiles and missile defense could be achieved within a three phase-approach, Phase 1: Based on experiences within the region and in the East-West context, the adoption of certain stabilization measures which may include efforts to cooperatively agree on fixed numbers for missiles and/or other weaponry. Phase 2: A reduction and prohibition of offensive weaponry as well as of so-called defensive weapons would be pursued, baring in mind that missile defense is not ‘purely defensive’. Phase 3: Comprehensive bans would be in place along with a Missile Free Zone established. With such arrangements, there would be two major challenges to cope with, firstly an effective verification measures to deter and detect potential cheaters and secondly a safeguards measure to prevent a reversal of commitments and capabilities in crisis times. Mr Haas concluded that the creation of a Missile Free Zone is a tool, the creation of a zone aims to increase the security for all in the region.
Sabahat Khan, defense analyst at the Institute for Near East and Gulf (UAE). Export controls within the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) had a limited effect, especially within the Middle East. MTCR members should provide good missile behavior with increased technical cooperation in the space sector. States in the Middle East and Gulf region, that have only undertaken minor missile transfers within and outside the region, may want to subscribe to the controls of the MTCR without formally joining it. The Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles (HCoC) is a weak regime designed as a confidence-building measure. Ironically, the weakness of HCoC could be attractive for the missile-relevant Middle Eastern/Gulf countries, none of which is a member. To join the HCoC could show that regional cooperation is possible in the security sector.

Christian Weidlich, graduate research assistant at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). Aside from PRIF efforts to contribute to the creation of a Missile Free Zone in the Middle East, the institute provides ideas, concepts, and background information on the planned Middle East Conference on the establishment of a WMD and Delivery Vehicles Free Zone. Bearing in mind that the Middle East conference is badly needed to foster communication among countries of the region, participating states will engage in a constructive manner and agree on follow-on steps only if they expect the Conference to bolster their security. The speaker was of the opinion that holding the Conference with an inclusive participation could already contribute to reducing tensions in the region, adding that less weapons can entail greater security.

Sven-Eric Fikenscher, research assistant at the Academic Peace Orchestra (Frankfurt). A promising starting point for the control and eventual elimination of delivery vehicles such as missiles and aircraft is the establishment of a certain degree of military transparency. In this regard, the United Nations Register for Conventional Arms (UNROCA) is a fruitful point of reference since it covers both categories: missiles and aircraft. However, the UNROCA only lists imported items and therefore needs to be revised and expanded. The revised UNROCA can create the political will needed to embark on the gradual reduction path towards a Missile Free Zone. In conclusion, the speaker stated that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) need to be included within the scope of delivery vehicles.

Panel VI: Regional Experiences and International Perspectives
Chair and moderator: Deobrah Rosenblum, executive vice-president of NTI

Ronald Sturm, head of unit/executive secretariat for Nuclear disarmament at the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Austria). Austria is member of the Human Security Network that takes a «humankind first» approach to security. Nuclear disarmament is a special responsibility of the nuclear weapon and nuclear armed states, but it also concerns all states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the (current) nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation regime. Its implementation is crucial to provide the confidence needed for nuclear disarmament and also for enjoying the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty provides the verification regime to ensure that no nuclear test explosion remains undetected. The Conference on Disarmament – the negotiating forum for disarmament - has been blocked for too long. Legal instruments alone do not suffice to ensure the complete elimination of nuclear weapons swiftly and effectively, further elements for a comprehensive legal nuclear disarmament framework need to be agreed upon. Civil Society is becoming more vocal in demanding nuclear disarmament. Individual states, groups of states, international organisations and civil society movements can fruitfully work together or support each other in creating and
improving the conditions needed for the swift and effective elimination of nuclear weapons by the nuclear possessor states.

Katsuhisa Furukawa, member of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) of United Nations Security. The sanction regime of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) regarding certain measures relating to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) had a considerable impact on non-proliferation efforts. Sanctions involve important measures including: arms embargo; nuclear, ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction programs related embargo; a ban on the export of luxury goods to the DPRK; and individual targeted sanctions. The speaker concluded by sharing with the audience examples of non-compliance reported to the 1718 Committee, including attempted smuggling to the Middle East; he explained the general patterns of sanction evasion and challenges of implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions. The speaker was not yet aware of illegal transfers from Middle East to N Korea.

Vijay Oberoi, member of the United Service Institute (India). The Middle East, as a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMD-FZ) has been discussed for decades, but progress has been limited. The appointment of a Facilitator is a welcomed development, but a realistic approach is needed to move forward. Everyone is agreed that a WMDFZ in the Middle East is not just desirable but essential; yet the task is difficult, as the region has a history of various types of conflicts. In such a situation, an incremental approach will pay dividends. The first task would be the building of a consensus between states. This would make the task of the Facilitator simpler. Lack of meaningful progress will adversely affect the current impetus to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The speaker concluded by stating that the past success achieved in declaring other Nuclear Weapons Free Zones in different parts of the world can not be extrapolated to the Middle East, as the circumstances and the milieu are different.

Anna Peczeli, affiliated to the Corvinus University of Budapest. The five NWFZs that are currently in place spans most of the southern hemisphere area, the presence of a NWFZ not only prevent the possession on nuclear weapons but further discuss non-stationing, non-use and in some occasions non-testing. Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) has always been considered as a regional approach to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Unresolved within the NWFZ concept are questions relating to the freedom of seas, transit rights and other issues. The case of the Middle East, however, is different from any of the existing zones. The inclusion of all WMDs and delivery vehicles in the case of the Middle East will broaden the scope of the zone and raises many new problems. The speaker highlighted important impediments against the creation of the zone including the lack of trust, ongoing transitions, unstable governments as well as non-existing regional bodies capable of verifying and monitoring.

Panel VII: Arab Spring and Regional Turmoil – Impact on WMDFZ Issues
Chair and moderator: Piet De Klerk, sherpa for the Nuclear Security Summit - Netherlands in 2014.

Anton V. Khlopkov, director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies (Russia). Committed to developing nuclear power for the best interests of the state, Iran’s goals have remained essentially the same since the 1970s when they were first formulated by the Shah’s regime. Together with diversifying electric power resources for the country, the development of nuclear technology was also utilized to providing
Iran with the scientific, technological and material resources that could be used for military purposes if there are strong incentives and based on the security concerns. Yet, there is no reliable information suggesting that the leadership in Iran has made the political decision to create nuclear weapons, either during the Shah time or recently. Due to many reasons, there is no military solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. This means that a resolution has to be sought in the political and diplomatic sphere. Iranian security concerns should be addressed. However, Iranian nuclear program is not the core of the problem, but rather a consequence of a very deep crisis in Iran-US relations. The keys for the solution are in Washington and Tehran (two keys rule applies here). Double elections (in the United States and Iran) could create new opportunities to accelerate a dialogue for finding a way out of the crisis.

Martin B. Malin, executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government. Israel’s strategic environment is undergoing rapid change. The increasing political participation of Arab publics will likely mean increased regional isolation for Israel and pressure on the nuclear issue. US-Israeli interests, while still closely aligned, have shown signs of divergence over Israel’s preferred course of action toward Iran and toward the Palestinians. Continuing interest in nuclear energy across the region will mean a continuing diffusion of nuclear knowledge. To confront these changes, Israel can attempt to extend its nuclear monopoly by preventing the emergence of nuclear capability in neighboring states through a combination of diplomatic effort, sabotage, and the use of military force; it can prepare to enter into and manage an active nuclear deterrent relationship with Iran and, eventually, perhaps other states in the region; it can seek formal security assurances from the United States; or, it can enter into negotiations with its neighbors to establish a regime that will regulate security relationships in the region, eventually putting its own capabilities on the negotiating table. Although these options are not mutually exclusive, in combination they do not co-exist easily and in some cases may be directly contradictory. The choices it makes will have a decisive impact on the prospects for establishing a cooperative regional security structure and WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Tom Sauer, associate professor in International Politics at the Universiteit Antwerpen (Belgium).

Iran is building up its nuclear program and economic sanctions will take time. Oil embargo is not universal and the Arab spring may lead to more instability in the region. Within the public conception, there is some uncertainty about a possible nuclear weapons program in Iran, the reason for this is what we have witnessed of false allegations in the case of Iraq. How likely is an Israeli attack, the speaker believes that Iran’s nuclear facilities are mostly underground and Israel doesn’t have the capabilities to attack heavily fortified facilities. When it comes to options of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, the speaker was of the opinion that Iran will witness an economic deterioration due to sanctions, this would demonstrate to the leaders in Iran the grave costs of a nuclear weapon program.

Daniel Müller, research associate at PRIF. Initiatives calling for the establishment of weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East have so far failed to achieve concrete results. The recent dramatic political shifts in the aftermath of the Arab uprising hold the potential of aggravating distrust. Observers fear that the newly emerging governments might adopt confrontational policies in regional issues. Egypt, one of the most influential states in the region and the strongest promoter of the zone is undergoing a substantial political transition. The introduction of a set of reciprocal confidence building measures between Egypt and Israel is greatly needed. The speaker highlighted the chances which the current transition phase might entail for Egypt’s arms control efforts, the new government, strengthened by new domestic legitimacy, could be able to strike new paths and end the stalemate surrounding arms control negotiations on a future MEWMDFZ.
Panel VIII: Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in the Middle East
Chair and moderator: Wael Al Assad, director of Multilateral Relations at the Headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo.

Jean-Loup Samaan, researcher and lecturer in NATO Defense College's. While media and experts focus their attention on the question of “when” or “if” Iran is going to cross the nuclear threshold, a new scenario is quietly looming: the scenario of nuclear opacity in the Middle East. In other words, there is increasingly a serious likelihood that in the coming five to ten years the Middle East could be the scene of power play between countries holding undeclared nuclear arsenals, namely Israel and Iran. This regional nuclear opacity could prove to be a major driver of instability in terms of conflict prevention and non-proliferation efforts. If we look at the history of the Iranian nuclear crisis, nothing has been more complicated and vexing for the analysts than to identify what precisely is the nuclear threshold, what are Iran's intentions and, finally, if at all Iran would cross this threshold. Nuclear opacity in the Middle East means no communication channel, and no declaratory policies. It entails no information on security perceptions, doctrines, capabilities, or targeting policies.

Tom Coppen, researcher at the Center for Conflict and Security Law – Utrecht University. The NPT provides a global platform for negotiations on nuclear disarmament. NPT Review Conferences have both an important political and legal function, they are the NPT’s mechanism for review, implementation and supervision. In legal terms, they NPT Revcons’s enable the evolution of the NPT based on subsequent agreement. Much has been written about the perceived weaknesses of the NPT and challenges it has been facing over the last decades. Despite these perceptions, the NPT managed to maintain its central role in the non-proliferation regime, this is due to sufficient flexibility within its review mechanism and its managerial approach to keep this position for the decades to come.

Alexander Kolbin, Program Coordinator at PIR Center (Russia). Within existing models of establishing a multilateral arms control and non-proliferation regimes, a number of initial steps could be taken by states of the region to overcome the current impasse and start a real movement towards the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Obviously, the region suffers from an acute mistrust created by historical, political, economic and social challenges which lead into a sensitive behavior. When it comes to establishing a permanent regional confidence building mechanism in the nuclear sphere, as well as chemical and biological weapons, its only natural to have parties refraining from the threat of using force. Although the creation of the zone would not resolve issues like Hezbollah, or standing issues between Iran and Gulf countries, the speaker recommends the ratification of additional protocols adding that trust-building and transparency measures may contribute to the process of establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

The panel also witnessed a briefing about the World Council of Churches and its programs on peace and security including disarmament issues. The unscheduled briefing was presented by Jonathan Frerichs, program executive at World Council of Churches (Geneva).

Panel IX: Linking with other Initiatives – Towards United Action
Chair and moderator: Khalid Al Bu-Ainnain (Chairman of Baynuna Group & INEGMA)

Ivo Slaus, president of the World Academy of Art and Science. Prof. Slaus highlighted the conclusions of the Dubrovnik meeting also discussing the prospects of a WMDFZ. The Conference on Nuclear Threats and Security organized by the World Academy of Art and Science, European Leadership Network and Dag Hammarskjöld University College under the NATO sponsorship emphasized that nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) in general and war do not solve any confrontation and that it is imperative to establish nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). World without nuclear weapons and eventually world without war are achievable goals. Countries in Middle East can benefit if Middle East NWFZ is established and extended to association of countries similar to EU.

Benjamin Hautecouverture, Research fellow at the CESIM and FRS. Mr. Hautecouverture highlighted the conclusions of the 2012 Brussels session of the EU Consortium. The July 2010 decision by the Council of the European Union created a network bringing together foreign policy institutions and research centres from across the EU to encourage political and security-related dialogue. The Brussels meeting was a good opportunity to engage think tanks, civil society, experts, researchers and academics in discussing measures to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The scope of activities also covered issues related to conventional weapons. The outcome of discussions are submitted to the responsible officials within the European Union

Ayman Khalil, director of the Arab Institute for Security Studies. Presented the conclusions of the Amman meeting and officially announced the launch of the Arab Consortium on Security and Disarmament which was sponsored and hosted by the Arab Institute for Security Studies. The Arab consortium held its inauguration meeting within the framework of the Amman meeting. The advancement of non-proliferation efforts and the establishment of a NWFZ requires not only government cooperation, but also the involvement of institutions, NGOs, and the global population.

As the number of initiatives are increasing, its vital to coordinate in order not to replicate and in order to magnify the output of these initiatives. Today, there exist a number of initiatives dedicated to promote the establishment of a WMDFZ-ME. Since these initiatives are dedicated to achieve the same objective, its only natural to harmonize such efforts and coordinate their activities. The Amman meeting called for establishing a Middle East Task Group that would act as an umbrella to bring together sporadic efforts in an effort to achieve consensus. Such task force could be utilized by the facilitator, it would also provide an appropriate mechanism to involve civil society involvement in the Helsinki conference or any other discussions.

The Amman meeting strongly calls for an effective involvement by international instruments, namely IAEA, OPCW, CTBTO .. etc and to practice a vibrant and effective role when it comes to establishing the zone. These instruments were specifically named within the context of the 2010 NPT Revcon final document to provide support to the facilitator.

The Amman meeting witnessed the launch of a specialized study prepared by ACSIS in cooperation with GCSP analyzing the role of civil society organizations as well as international instruments.

The organizers concluded by stressing on the importance on maintaining dialogue and called for a civil society review conference to be held in Amman during 2013.
Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group
Workshop on Building International Confidence and Responsibility in Nuclear Security

Amman, Jordan
November 14, 2012

Summary Report

Stemming from the belief that progress on the nuclear security track will positively impact non-proliferation efforts, the Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) in cooperation with the Nuclear Security Governance Experts Group (NSGEG) convened the nuclear security workshop in Amman, Jordan on November 14, 2012. The NSGEG is a globally diverse group with broad nuclear sector experience assessing the current state of nuclear security governance and developing a realistic and comprehensive set of policy recommendations intended to facilitate improvement in the nuclear security regime and the continued peaceful use of nuclear power. It is a project of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Partnership for Global Security, and the Stanley Foundation.

The discussions included four substantive discussion tracks:

- Defining an end state for nuclear security
- Balancing sovereignty with global responsibility
- Nuclear security structures beyond the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS)
- Messaging on and educating about the importance of nuclear security

The objective of the workshop was to generate policy recommendations on how to increase international confidence and responsibility in nuclear security. The discussions greatly benefited from the insights of regional experts recommended by ACSIS, including from Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia. Initial recommendations from this event will be published as part of a full conference report and posted on the NSGEG website. They will then be integrated with related policy recommendations derived from prior NSGEG workshops in London and Seoul and promoted to nuclear stakeholders to help create a more robust, flexible, and comprehensive global nuclear security governance system.

Participants envisioned necessary measures to eliminate weak links from the international nuclear security regime. They examined the roles of national systems, international instruments, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other multilateral initiatives, such as the NSS process, in achieving this ambitious goal. Participants considered objectives for the 2014 NSS and follow-on structures and initiatives that could outlive the summit process. An international framework agreement for nuclear security was one option considered for strengthening and streamlining the current patchwork system.

Participants discussed the benefits of an expanded definition of nuclear security that includes fissile materials, radiological sources, and nuclear facilities, and the relevance of the issue to all states. They explored regional approaches to advancing global nuclear security, including how the network of centers of excellence established as part of the NSS process and sponsored by the IAEA and European Union could help foster cooperation and build local capacities. Radiological security was identified as one important area that is well-suited for regional collaboration. Discussions were especially important due to the presence and participation of Ambassador Piet de Klerk, Ambassador of the Netherlands in Amman and sherpa of NSS 2014.
The Amman meeting facilitated and sponsored the first coordination meeting of Arab research centers and think tanks involved in nuclear non-proliferation and the establishment of a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons as well as all forms of weapons of mass destruction was convened in Amman on November 12th, 2012 and hosted by the Arab Institute for Security Studies.

Earlier on, the League of Arab States in cooperation with Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs had hosted a conference in Cairo involving Arab research centers and think tanks. The Cairo conference was held on May 28th and 29th, 2012 and concluded with a consensus to form the Arab Consortium on Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with specific emphasis of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons and all forms of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

Today, the total number of research centers, organizations and think tanks that joined the consortium reached a total of 16 institutes. Participants in the Amman coordination meeting included:

1- Egyptian Council on Foreign Affairs (ECFA) (Egypt)
2- Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS) (Jordan)
3- MENA Center for Strategic Studies (Lebanon)
4- Institute for Near East & Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) (UAE)
5- Strategic and Global Risk Assessment Center (SAGRA) (UAE)
6- Egyptian Pugwash Society for Science & International Affairs (Egypt)
7- Permanent Peace Movement (PPM) (Lebanon)
8- Iraq Council for Peace and Solidarity (Iraq)
9- Arab Thought Forum (ATF) (Jordan HQ)
10- Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (Egypt)
11- Moroccan Center for Interdisciplinary Strategic Studies (Morocco)
12- Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidarity Organization (Egypt)

As a result of the Amman deliberations hosted by the Arab Institute for Security Studies on November 12th, 2012, the following was agreed upon:
• Declare the creation of the Arab Consortium on Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation with the purpose of establishing a zone free from nuclear weapons as well as all forms of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (WMDFZME).
• The Consortium seeks to support Arab effort on the international scene not only in the filed of non-proliferation but also it what relates regional security issues that are of interest to the region and to the globe. The consortium will provide decision makers in Arab countries with studies, proposal as well as suggesting feasible options to assist decisions and plan policies with a view of achieving common Arab interests
• The Consortium welcomes joint cooperation with the League of Arab States in its efforts aiming to create a WMDFZME. To achieve this objective, the Consortium will provide any required studies, analyses and support.
• Establish a quad-lateral committee to coordinate, to follow-up and to plan Consortium activities and programs. The committee will meet on a rotational basis, its membership is renewed on a biannual basis; quad-lateral committee currently consist of ECFA, ACSIS, INEGMA and ATF.
• Hold an annual meeting (or semi-annual meetings whenever needed) for consortium members to discuss emerging issues and important developments in the field of non-proliferation and establishing a WMDFZME. The annual meeting will be hosted by one of the Consortium member, the host institute will be responsible for logistical arrangements and becomes a chairman of the Consortium for a one year period
• The Arab Institute for Security Studies will chair the coordination committee
• The Consortium welcomes the membership of any Arab research institutes interested in security and non-proliferation issues
• The Arab Consortium on Security and Nuclear Non-Proliferation stress on the importance of its engagement in the Helsinki meeting and the overall representation of civil society sector.
• The Arab Consortium affirms the importance of coordinating and cooperating with international research centers and civil society organizations of similar interests.

Drafted in Amman (Jordan)
November 12th, 2012